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Abstract: Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) programs are increasingly
employed to encourage individual actors to preserve and/or restore environmentally beneficial instream flows in freshwater ecosystems. However, the success of these PES programs has been mixed across geographic locations and the
influence of local resource management institutions remains unclear. In the western U.S.A. little is known about the role of irrigation districts regarding these
water transactions. This study addresses that deficit by using existing knowledge
about common-pool resource management characteristics to explore the role of
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irrigation districts in PES programs that incentivize water transactions in the state
of Oregon. We conducted 20 semi-structured interviews with irrigation district
managers and water transaction experts across the state in order to identify characteristics that influenced differential adoption of market-based PES programs for
water. Our results reveal three groups of districts based on: rule formation, physical infrastructure, and user homogeneity. These groupings provide a means of
categorizing institutional interactions and outcomes that correspond with district
adaptability to water transactions. Specifically, we identify congruence between
local conditions and rules as well as investment in infrastructure as design principles that shape how irrigation district managers responded to market-based PES.
Keywords: Common-pool resource management, instream flows, irrigation districts, PES, qualitative methods, water transactions
Acknowledgement: The authors would like to thank the Clearwater Fly
Casters for their support of this work. Special thanks to Barbara Cosens, Alex
Fremier, Dustin Garrick, Bruce Aylward, the Oregon Water Resources Congress,
the Columbia Basin Water Transaction Program, the Freshwater Trust, and the
Deschutes River Conservancy for their insights and advice. We are grateful for the
time and thoughtful input we received from all of the irrigation district managers
that participated in this research.

1. Introduction
Water scarcity threatens the sustainability of coupled human and natural systems
throughout the world. While climate change and population growth will exacerbate water scarcity, proper water governance can help address scarcity by encouraging more efficient uses of water (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004; Bruns et al. 2005).
Improved water governance can help balance trade-offs between direct benefits
from economic uses of water (e.g. irrigation, stock watering) and indirect benefits
from maintaining ecosystems services (e.g. wild fish habitat) (Garrick et al. 2011).
Allocating water out of stream for agriculture can degrade or dewater streams
that serve habitat needs of native salmon, including spawning grounds and fish
passage. Market-based mechanisms known as Payments for Ecosystem Services
(PES) are an increasingly popular approach for addressing the negative ecological
impacts of overdrawing water for agriculture (Banerjee and Bark 2013). However,
PES programs are often designed without consideration of, or input from, local
resource management institutions or resource users. In this paper we explicitly
focus on how irrigation districts, acting as local common-pool resource institutions, contend with the implementation of these PES programs.
PES programs provide beneficiaries of ecosystem services the opportunity to
pay property rights holders to protect or improve the ecosystem services provided
by their property (Farley and Costanza 2010). Thus, we characterize transactions
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for instream flows (here forward ‘water transactions’) offered through voluntary
programs as a form of PES (Kolinjivadi et al. 2014). Agricultural users may sell or
lease their water rights and forego watering crops in order to keep water ‘instream’
and continue the provisioning of ecological benefits (Baron et al. 2002; Millenium
Ecosystem Assessment 2005).
Effective incorporation and cooperation with local institutions is crucial to
the success of PES programs broadly (Adhikari and Agrawal 2013). Yet, despite
growing interest in and use of water-related PES programs in the western U.S.A.,
few assessments directly examine how local institutions, such as irrigation districts, respond to these PES programs. Local institutions have been shown to
hinder implementation and discourage participation in water transactions among
water rights holders (Garrick et al. 2009; Ranjan 2010; Grafton et al. 2011) but the
institutional necessity of these actions remains under examined.
Existing studies of water transactions indicate that participation varies widely
within watersheds. However, the influence of local institutions, such as irrigation
districts, on variation in participation is understudied (Brewer et al. 2007; Garrick
and Aylward 2012; Cook and Rabotyagov 2014). In the western U.S.A., irrigation
districts have helped manage water for agricultural users for more than a century.
Irrigation districts enforce state and local rules by marshaling collective action
to deliver surface water (Heinmiller 2009). While individuals hold water rights
that entitle them to a fixed amount of water at specific locations and times, many
water rights holders rely on a centralized irrigation district to deliver water and
manage water rights until the water is delivered. Thus, irrigation districts are local
level common-pool resource management (CPRM) institutions that adapt formal
rules (e.g. prior appropriation) and effectively manage common-pool resources by
formulating operational rules that meet the conditions of the resource. Examples
of irrigation districts’ management actions include adapting rules to the needs of
users, detecting and sanctioning rule violations, holding officials accountable to
users, and distributing resources equitably (Ostrom 1990; Agrawal 2003).
For this research we use qualitative interviews with irrigation district managers across the state of Oregon, U.S.A., to identify how local contextual variables
(both physical attributes and attributes of the population) and institutional arrangements within irrigation districts might facilitate differential participation in water
transactions program. Oregon was chosen as a state that relies on irrigation but is
attempting to maintain instream flows to protect salmon fisheries through water
transactions, which inevitably affect operations of irrigation districts. We solidify
qualitative observations into a typology of districts.
Exploring differences among local water institutions and their potential influence on the feasibility of PES programs can serve a number of practical purposes,
including: (1) a means to better explain variations in water transaction participation across districts; (2) the basis for adapting water transaction programs to the
local context of diverse areas; (3) the development of strategies that allow PES
programs to serve complimentary roles for local institutions and; (4) the identification of other potential barriers for PES programs (Paveglio et al. 2017).
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2. Background
2.1. Water management institutions in the western U.S.A.
Water resource management in the western U.S.A. is a complex and multi-
layered system that involves local, state and federal institutional entities. The
federal government has played a role in developing water for irrigation by
funding the construction of dams and infrastructure for water conveyance (for
a review see Hansen et al. 2009). However, irrigation districts, (here forward
‘districts’) manage more than half of the water used for irrigation in the western
U.S.A. (Thompson 1993).
Districts throughout the western U.S.A. use both formal and informal rules
in order to distribute and allocate water according to state systems of privatized
usufruct rights (North 1990; Heinmiller 2009). In these respects, districts adhere
broadly to the “design principles” of CPRM institutions (Ostrom 1990, 1993; Cox
et al. 2010). CPRM institutions help manage and distribute benefits and responsibilities equitably among interdependent users to ensure the sustained provision of
a resource over the long-term (Ostrom 1990; Agrawal 2001).
“Design principles” represent governance characteristics that facilitate
the successful governance of a common-pool resource system (Ostrom 1993).
Although Ostrom’s institutional design principles can increase the likelihood of
successful common pool resources (CPR) systems (Ostrom 1993; Baggio et al.
2016), ultimately, success depends on contextual variables such as physical attributes of the natural infrastructure, local context of rules and norms, and the hard
infrastructure needed (i.e. type of canals, investment needed in hard infrastructure
etc.) (Tang 1992; Baggio et al. 2016; Barnett et al. 2016).
One of the primary functions of districts is enforcing the state’s system of
water property rights known as prior appropriation (Thompson 1993; Ruml
2005). Prior appropriation provides access to water for private individuals as
a private, usufruct right, according to the order in which water uses were first
established (Getches 2009). Retaining ownership of a water right is contingent
upon the ‘beneficial use’ (Getches 2009). Districts often use their own rules and
norms to help facilitate cooperation among individuals and help prevent conflicts over water (Vermillion 1996; German and Keeler 2010; Lafreniere et al.
2013).
2.2. Water management institutions and transactions in Oregon
Water rights in Oregon fall into three classifications: (1) state, where water is publically owned, held in trust by the state that issues water rights for private use; (2)
communal, where water rights can be owned jointly by individuals and the district
that deliver their water; and (3) private, usufruct rights, where an individual is
given the right to use water for private benefit and provided conditional access
based on the rules of prior appropriation (Oregon Supreme Court 2008; Getches
2009; Aylward 2013). These multiple layers of property rights, ownership, and
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local management pose challenges to developing tradable water rights for water
transactions (Rosegrant and Binswanger 1994).
Three important institutional changes were made in Oregon during the mid1990s to facilitate water transactions. Those changes included: (1) allowing
instream flows to be considered a ‘beneficial use’ under prior appropriation; (2)
creating a state-run program through which water transactions could be legally
performed; and (3) allowing individuals to retain up to 75% of the water saved
from water efficiency upgrades, which can be applied to new lands, but requiring
they put at least 25% of the water saved back instream (Aylward 2013).
These state-level changes in Oregon were important for federal agencies such
as the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), which created the Columbia Basin
Water Transaction Program that funds local non-profits to buy or lease water from
local users for improvement of salmon spawning habitat. These non-profits are
now the primary buyers of water for instream flows across the Columbia Basin
(Garrick and Aylward 2012).
Water transactions evolved from water markets that allow the transfer of water
rights for a negotiated exchange. These water transactions fit Wunder’s (2015)
definition of a PES in that they are, “a voluntary transaction between service users
(buyers) and service providers (sellers) that are conditional upon agreed rules
of natural resource management for generating offsite services” (Wunder 2015,
241). PES programs potentially reduce market failures, which results in the lower
provision of ecosystem services as a public good (Farley and Costanza 2010).
The theoretical premise of PES suggests that individuals are economically rational actors who will use their resources in order to maximize profits (Ferraro and
Kiss 2002). Research on participation in water transactions has largely focused
on the individual characteristics that influence participation such as education,
age, wealth, and farm size (Pannell et al. 2006; Wheeler et al. 2009). However,
these studies largely ignore the social and institutional contexts of these decisions
and results have been largely inconclusive, suggesting that economic motivations
are inconsistent or that other external factors may be influencing participation
(Garrick and Aylward 2012; Cook and Rabotyagov 2014). The lack of participation in PES schemes may be the result of a social dilemma, where the interest of
the group is at odds with the individual (Ostrom et al. 1999).
Observations of the program reveal that adequate stream flow and water quality conditions have not yet been fully realized in many critical salmon streams,
and suggest that institutional differences across and within states may contribute
to the heterogeneity in outcomes (Neuman 2004; Garrick and Aylward 2012). One
way districts can influence water transactions is by lending credibility to the transaction and process, essentially encouraging members to trust water transactions as
an acceptable use of water (Uzzi 1996; Lafreniere et al. 2013). Meanwhile, several authors argue that districts impede transactions by adding constraints to individuals’ ability to perform transactions (Bretsen and Hill 2009; Libecap 2009).
This research uses qualitative data to explore the confluence of localized
contextual variables and localized institutional arrangements in order to help
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determine the response by local districts to water transactions. We propose the
following research questions: (1) What formal rules or informal norms do district
managers report regarding members’ participation in water transactions? (2) How
do contextual factors (social, physical and institutional) influence the rules and
norms district managers use to adapt state rules that allow water transactions?

3. Methods
3.1. Study site
This research focuses on districts where instream flows are critical for salmon
habitat. That includes districts in central and eastern Oregon – arid and semiarid parts of the state where irrigated agriculture accounts for upwards 80%
of surface water use (Brewer et al. 2007; Oregon Department of Agriculture
2012). All districts draw water from rivers systems supporting native salmon
and therefore subject to the Endangered Species Act. Surface water in these
regions is expected to diminish due to climatic changes (Franczyk and Chang
2009). Coastal areas and districts surrounding the greater Portland metropolitan area were excluded from this study because they have not faced surface
water scarcity issues and thus have not been targeted for water transactions for
increasing instream flows.
3.2. A framework for understanding district context
The approach used in this paper segments districts into similar groupings based
on attributes identified in past research on CPRM institutions. Segmentation of
districts by key attributes can help identify common challenges or opportunities that influence the strategies those districts take when adapting to external
institutional changes (Agrawal 2001). More specifically, qualitative approaches
can help uncover the complex relationship between CPRM institution characteristics and the design principles that guide those CPRM institutions (Barnett
et al. 2016). Other authors have used similar approaches and typologies to better
understand how group characteristics influence institutional and social responses
to natural resource management of water and wildfire (Huber-Stearns et al. 2015;
Paveglio et al. 2015).
The segmentation used here is based on five enabling conditions/characteristics commonly mentioned in existing CPRM literature: (1) resource
characteristics; (2) group or user characteristics; (3) relationships between
resource systems and group characteristics; (4) institutional arrangements;
and (5) external environment (Ostrom 1994; Merrey 1996; Agrawal 2001). We
combined conditions two and three as the two are closely related in the context of irrigation. Agrawal (2001) notes that each condition includes numerous
attributes, and for each attribute a spectrum of variation may exist. See Table 1
for a description of the CPRM characteristics and their grounding in existing
literature.

District attributes

Water availability
Water source
Water right priority

Water dependence
Homogeneity
Group size

Water sharing/Transfers
Infrastructure
Delivery efficiency

Relationships with other entities
Federal and state laws

CPRM enabling
characteristics

Resource characteristics

User characteristics

Existing institutions

External environment

Table 1: Analysis framework.

Quality of relationships that districts have with other organizations
Enforcement of Endangered Species Act or other environmental
regulations

Water sharing – Ability to lease or transfer water to other patrons
within the district
Infrastructure – Physical capacity to physical move water
Delivery efficiency – the ability to move water with minimal waste

Water dependence – district member reliance on water for
livelihood
Homogeneity – similarity of water use within a district
Group size – the number of patrons served by a district

Water availability – level of scarcity or uncertainty
Water source – physical location and surface water type
Water right priority is the order in which the district receives water
relative to other districts in the basin

Attribute descriptions

(Ostrom 1994; Merrey
1996; Agrawal 2001)

(Tang 1992; Ostrom
1994; Garrick and
Aylward 2012)

(Ostrom 1990, 1994;
Agrawal 2001)

(Tang 1992; MeinzenDick 2007)

Supporting literature
for attributes
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3.3. Data collection
We conducted key informant interviews in order to understand if and how
districts have adapted to institutional reforms that support water transactions.
Researchers selected district managers as key informants because they could
provide insight on the biophysical, social and institutional contexts that influence how each district operates within a coupled human and natural system
(Postel 2000). Key informants are individuals with in-depth knowledge that can
provide unique insights about a phenomenon under investigation (Huberman
1994). Two criteria related to Oregon districts were used in the approach for
selecting the districts studied during this research: (1) a primary purpose of
delivering water to water rights holders; and (2) membership in the Oregon
Water Resources Congress (OWRC). The OWRC represents the interests of districts in the state legislature and provides publicly available contact information
for irrigation district managers. OWRC staff noted that districts not belonging
to OWRC are typically much smaller, but operate in similar way to member
districts. A total of 25 districts (out of 41 OWRC districts) fit the criteria outlined above. Sixteen districts (64%) responded to requests for interviews. If a
district did not respond after the first request they were contacted at least two
additional times.
Researchers conducted sixteen interviews with district managers, and four
additional interviews with state and regional managers of district associations and
water transactions programs. District managers indicated that state and regional
informants could provide an overarching perspective of water transactions and
the role of districts in water leasing programs, and these interviews were used to
contextualize interviews with district managers. We conducted all twenty interviews in the winter of 2014. Interviews lasted between 20 minutes and 1.5 hours.
They were recorded for subsequent transcription and analysis. After sixteen interviews (four with water transaction program managers and twelve with irrigation
district managers) we determined we had reached theoretical saturation, the point
at which no new or novel information was being obtained from new interviews
(Bryman 2015). The final four interviews with district managers verified that theoretical saturation was achieved.
Interviews followed a semi-structured interview guide developed by the
researchers (Appendix A). Given the relative lack of research regarding how
districts interact with PES-type programs, semi-structured interviews were
determined to be the most appropriate exploratory approach (Huberman 1994).
The protocol for this research focused on institutional changes regarding water
transactions, water transaction activity, infrastructure, water uses, district history, and local user demographics. Interviewees were asked follow-up questions
to obtain more information about topics discussed in their response. Interviewers
also prompted managers to discuss formal rules about water management as well
as their perceptions of informal rules regarding water transactions within the
district.
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3.4. Data analysis
A first round of thematic coding identified preliminary themes about district attributes or local context using the four characteristics of CPRM described above.
Researchers also coded for examples of formal and informal rule changes within
a district (Table 1) (Greene 2007). A second round employed “pattern coding”
(Saldaña 2015, 236) to identify additional emergent but unexpected themes
related to district characteristics and rule changes.
Two of the authors performed three independent rounds of coding on two
interview transcripts and compared codes for consistency of theme content.
Agreements occurred when both coders assigned a passage or paragraph to
the same theme. Disagreements occurred when researchers coded the same
statement differently or when researchers did not include the same interview
segment into a theme. Cohen’s Kappa was calculated to evaluate the level of
agreement between coders about the themes found across interviews; the final
three rounds of coding produced a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.75. A Kappa of 0.7 or
higher suggests a substantial amount of agreement between coders (Campbell
et al. 2013). After coding reliability was established, the first author coded the
remaining interviews.
Researchers employed a final round of axial coding to group districts into
three categories based on similar expressions of thematic codes and emergent
characteristics from previous coding phases, following the approach of Paveglio
et al. (2015). We looked at differences across each of the CPRM characteristics and then began sorting districts into groups based on shared expression of
those characteristics. For example, in the CPRM condition ‘resource characteristics,’ there were three groupings that emerged from the coding process: senior
water rights, mixed, and junior water rights holders. These three groupings were
related to formal and informal rule changes that occurred within the districts, and
we used them to explain why districts have taken different approaches to dealing with changes to state water laws regarding instream flows (Wheeldon and
Ahlberg 2011). This final combination of codes created conceptual categories for
how and why districts chose their water management strategies (Saldaña 2015,
245).

4. Results
Based on the analysis described above, we found a clear distinction between three
different groupings of districts: (1) water rights protectors: districts that were
hesitant to adopt new rules related to water transactions; (2) cautious converters:
districts that made incremental changes to water use rules and infrastructure; and
(3) new pioneers: districts characterized by strong formalized institutional rules
and piped water delivery systems that reduce water loss. Descriptions of their
CPRM characteristics are summarized in Table 2 and described in the following
sections.

Water rights protectors

Low costs for water delivery
Low efficiency water delivery

Homogenous,
High agricultural dependency

Static formal rules, accompanied by
social norms
Mix of junior and senior water rights

Few connections to other entities,
typically contractual agreements
with Bureau of Reclamation

Instream leasing informally
discouraged

CPRM characteristics

Resource characteristic

User characteristics

Existing institutions

External environment

Integration with
transactions

Table 2: District groupings.

Instream leasing allowed lack formal
mechanism for instream leasing

Increasingly integrated, collaborating
to improve water security or address
environmental concerns

Dynamic formal rules
Junior water rights

Increasingly heterogeneous suburban
uses

High cost for water delivery
Seeking opportunities for replacing
aging infrastructure

Cautious converters

Provide mechanisms for allowing
instream leasing

Highly integrated with other
districts, state and federal agencies,
and local watershed institutions

Dynamic formal rules
Senior water rights

Heterogeneous, high profit crops

Low cost for water delivery
High efficiency water delivery

New pioneers
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4.1. Water rights protectors
Districts that fall within the water rights protectors group tend to serve agriculture-dependent communities. Managers in this group described their patrons as
having large farms and therefore substantial water rights for that land. Patrons
were generally more homogeneous in their water use for agricultural production.
Managers emphasized that land values in these districts are tied strongly to availability of water rights for land. For instance, one district manager described how
irrigating crops made a large difference in profits:
“You get up there on the dry farms and you are talking about $100, $200 bucks
an acre, and down on the irrigated ground, you are talking [$5000 to $6000]
an acre… If you miss a watering on your potato field your production drops
20%.”
Managers conveyed a sense that their patrons knew the existing districts rules
about water use and typically followed them without threat of enforcement.
Managers reported that rules about water use changed infrequently and turnover
among board members was also infrequent, with some board members serving
20–30 years. District managers and district board members were often agricultural producers.
Managers of these districts emphasized that it is important to keep water with
the land. Allocating water rights to other uses, like instream flows, elicited sentiments of trepidation and mistrust toward the state or other entities interested in
utilizing the water for other purposes. As one eastern Oregon district manager
articulated:
“I think a lot of our patrons are pretty scared to do anything different, thinking
that somebody from somewhere else might take that and run with it. And they
don’t want to get in a situation like that.”
While most of the districts reported some piping and in-district efficiency projects,
on-going efforts to continue piping and improve efficiency were not priorities due
to the high upfront costs and long payback periods for infrastructure investments.
Several managers in the water rights protectors group said they would not seek
funding from the state to help pipe their canals because doing so would require
allocating a minimum of 25% of the water savings to instream flows. District
managers in the water rights protectors group indicated they did not have particularly strong working relationships with other organizations, agencies or districts
and they rarely work with outside groups to fund water efficiency projects, due in
part to the requirement of putting some of the saved water back instream.
4.2. Cautious converters
Districts in the cautious converters group focused on maintaining compliance
with state and federal rules. Many of the managers described a need for clearly
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defined rules so they can adapt their infrastructure and rules to be in-line with
regulations. These district managers described the increasing scarcity of water,
due to increasing demand and/or managing junior water rights. Water diversion
and delivery infrastructure in these districts created significant costs and managers often discussed the need to replace or update this infrastructure.
Managers from this group described their patrons as increasingly hetero
geneous. Several managers noted that the mix of users is driven by the conversion of agricultural land to suburban development, therefore shifting water from
irrigation to domestic uses. Agriculture as a livelihood was still a major part of
the patron base, but these districts also reported serving an increasing number of
“hobby farmers” and suburban populations.
Nearly all of the managers in the cautious converter group discussed improving water delivery efficiency projects as a way to meet demand. They considered state programs requiring that a portion of conserved water be dedicated to
instream flows as an acceptable compromise for better efficiency. Many of the
managers in the cautious converters group sought funding to address aging infrastructure. However, the financial resources remained a limiting factor in completing these projects. While funding from partners was necessary, managers noted
that it often came with conditions and more stringent regulatory requirements. As
one manager noted:
“We just have to spend the money that the district can in cost-share with the
bureau, or grants, and play the game that way and that’s all we can do.”
Patron-to-patron water leasing as a means to meet new and growing water
demands was prevalent in cautious converters districts. Individual leases for
water instream had been allowed through board approvals, but often no formal
rules existed to guide the transactions process. Managers often described instream
flows programs as a less preferable option to leasing between patrons, because
the latter could respond to internal agricultural demands. While most district representatives reported that instream leasing was infrequent, a few reported that it
could be a beneficial tool to “park” water – and thus avoid claims that water was
not being put to beneficial use.
4.3. New pioneers
New pioneer districts are best characterized as promoting innovations and
actively seeking ways to improve water management through technological
and/or institutional rule changes. Managers from these districts described the
completion of many large-scale efficiency projects, collaborating with funding
partners for large projects, adding in-pipe turbines for hydro-electricity production to reduce costs or generate revenue, and contributing to instream flow
restoration efforts. Managers in this group describe themselves and their efforts
as aligned with the cultural history of the West that requires innovation to adapt
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to a harsh and variable climate. Thus, efforts to improve irrigation efficiency
were described as culturally appropriate rather than a necessary concession or
an outright threat.
The majority of managers in these districts reported that their patrons held
senior water rights on their water supply. Often this coincided with being positioned to draw water from tributary streams in the upper reaches of a watershed,
which is of particular importance for salmon habitat. Interviewees described these
situations through the refrain, “Not all water is created equal.” Thus, the positioning of the new pioneer districts often makes them attractive partners for environmental groups.
District managers suggested that the composition of water users in their districts
was heterogeneous, with a mixture of high-value crop farmers (e.g. cherries, pears,
and apples), hobby farmers, and growing suburban communities. Agriculturalintensive patrons in this group had installed high-efficiency irrigation technology
such as micro-sprinklers and drip irrigation. These irrigation techniques were possible because districts had piped irrigation systems, which were able to supply
pressurized water. Patrons using more efficient systems reduced their demand for
water, leaving more water to be put to instream or transferred to other users.
Many new pioneer district managers came from outside of the district,
bringing with them new ideas and perspectives on water use and water management. One manager even compared running the district to running a small utility
company, where the objective was to provide a reliable service at the lowest cost
possible while also being good stewards and neighbors. Managers from the new
pioneers described districts as having a role to play in improving environmental
conditions, but noted the need for collaboration within the district and with outside partners to achieve those goals. As one respondent articulated:
“The river was dry for 100 years. And it wasn’t one guy that did it. It was
everybody, and we’re not going to bring those fish back over night…we’ve
done it incrementally. And DEQ, EPA guys, those are some of our biggest
allies.”
New pioneer districts sought out multiple partners to work on large infrastructure projects. They frequently described utilizing external funding from state or
federal programs for improving infrastructure, which contribute some percent
of water back to instream flows. Large infrastructure projects were described as
long-term investments. District managers indicated that piping projects served to
substantially reduce operation and management costs through reduced pumping
costs or through electricity-generating projects. Most of the new pioneer districts
had fully piped systems. As one manager described:
“We are looking for ways to do projects that put water instream to improve
the water quality… We might only be able to add three to five [cubic feet per
second], but that water is ten degrees colder.”
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Districts managers were willing to allow their patrons to perform water transactions between users and for instream flows. Two of the districts noted that they
had made rules to prohibit permanent transactions that put water instream because
it would diminish the amount of water the district manages. Temporary instream
leases, however, were seen as an important tool. They were a common, albeit low
percentage, proportion of the district’s’ water use.

5. Discussion
The results provided above reiterate the importance of understanding local contextual variables, rules, and norms in order to understand how water transactions,
as a new intuitional arrangement, are integrated with existing local CPRM management. Tailoring PES programs to meet local conditions and concerns is a key
component of improving adoption and performance (Kerr et al. 2012; Hayes et al.
2015). Districts as CPRM institutions have the potential to directly and indirectly
influence participation in environmental water transactions through formal rules
and informal norms.
These results highlight the fact that districts are the most immediate and
meaningful level of resource governance between end-users and larger institutional arrangements (Tang 1992; Ostrom 1993, 1999; Baggio et al. 2016; Barnett
et al. 2016). Obviously, soliciting end-users will be necessary to confirm these
observations, but focusing on the results of these qualitative interviews with managers allows for a typological assessment of the self-perception of managers.
Characteristics of the hard, human-made infrastructures (e.g. piped water system)
emerged from this typology as an important influence to institutional arrangements. These interviews reveal that infrastructure upgrades have the potential to
enable instream flow transactions.
5.1. Existing institutions
District processes and the frequency of rule changes emerged as an important
institutional context that structured how and when districts integrated with statelevel institutional changes. New pioneer districts reported regularly updating
local rules (annually or bi-annually) to better align themselves with changes in
state laws. This helped districts provide guidance to their members about leases as
an allowable water use. The ability to adapt rules to changing resource conditions
has been identified as a factor contributing to the robustness of CPRM institutions
(Baggio et al. 2016). Most cautious converters dealt with leases on a case-bycase basis. The pressure to change rules had not outweighed the potential risks
and specific costs of making those changes. In general, new pioneer and cautious
converter districts reported more heterogeneity among water users and clearer
formal rules, which is one of the primary contextual variables pertinent to collective action (Ostrom et al. 1999).
Water rights protector districts suggested that their rules change very little from year-to-year. In settings where users are more homogeneous and few
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changes to rules occurred, social norms were adequate to coordinate collective
action among members. These findings support Roland’s (2004) work suggesting that reliance on norms may slow institutional responses to external changes.
Demographic changes in these districts may have weakened informal norms surrounding water use and created a need for clear rules since new members would
be unfamiliar with social norms that inform water use decisions (Agrawal 2001;
Kingston and Caballero 2006).
5.2. Infrastructure
The need to replace, repair, or upgrade water delivery infrastructure emerged as an
important characteristic with implications for districts’ physical capacity to allow
leasing. Upgrading delivery infrastructure eliminates an important collective
action constraint posed by some instream leasing arrangements (Rosegrant and
Binswanger 1994). Piping projects can reduce third party effects (e.g. diminished
delivery due to reduced upstream diversion). Physical infrastructure is an important variable affecting the successful governance of surface water as a commonpool resource (Baggio et al. 2016). The importance of infrastructure upgrades to
facilitate water transactions warrants further investigation.
Paying for upgrades to improve water infrastructure poses significant challenges for district managers. Clear differences emerged regarding how districts
prioritized and paid for water efficiency projects. New pioneer and some cautious
converter districts formed collaborative partnerships to help finance piping projects. While managers acknowledged that the state, tribal and local partners who
helped finance their projects often had different end goals, they were capable of
negotiating arrangements resulting in mutual benefits that could otherwise not be
achieved. This suggests that trust between partners is important for implementing
programs that produce win-win outcomes (Kingston and Caballero 2006).
In contrast, water rights protectors took more incremental approaches to piping
their systems. Several managers explained that upgrading “piece by piece” could
avoid the need for external funding assistance, allowing the district to retain all of
their water savings from efficiency improvements. This may suggest that water
rights protectors are loss averse, foregoing benefits like cost-savings by incrementally upgrading their systems (Elmqvist et al. 2010). Water rights protectors often
described potential funding partners, like the state, environmental groups, and
Native American tribes, as competitors for water. This sense of competition may
exacerbate loss aversion. Due to this loss aversion, funding efficiency upgrades for
the district via temporary water leases rather than targeting individuals may help
develop relationships, improve trust, increase resource security for the districts and
eventually reduce transaction costs of future instream flows.
5.3. Resource characteristics
We found that the characteristics of water rights, including seniority, location,
and allocation, help determine where incentives are offered and the value of
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those incentives. This variation in value may shape how districts respond – or
pressure from patrons to better integrate water transactions in their functioning
(Baland and Platteau 1997). New pioneer districts held more senior water rights,
which gave them more leverage and exposed them to less risk when allowing
transactions.
On the other hand, water rights protector districts generally held more
junior water rights, posing some risk that water rights may not be completely
filled. Individual decisions to lease water rights could negatively impact other
users in these districts. During water shortages, managers may pool all water
rights and share water to lessen impacts on the most junior water-rights holders. Instream leasing could reduce water availability, thus exposing districts
with more junior water rights to more risk, creating a social dilemma (Ostrom
et al. 1999).
5.4. Lessons for PES
Our results suggest that the response of local institutions to PES programs is
likely to vary with the potential to affect individual property owners’ participation. Put another way, water transaction programs designed for individuals may
be mediated through irrigation districts operating as local level CPRM institutions. CPRM institutions have largely been characterized as inhibiting transactions (Bretsen and Hill 2009; Libecap 2009).
Our findings suggest that districts inhibiting participation in water trans
actions do so in order to protect collective benefits for their members. Districts
may oppose water transactions for a number of reasons, some of which include:
(1) fear of losing control over water rights due to mistrust of government and
environmental non-profits, (2) negative externalities (or third party effects) such
as a decrease in the volume of water a district can divert, which decreases the
hydraulic pressure necessary for delivering water to patrons at the end of a canal,
and (3) increased monitoring and administrative costs associated with changing water uses (Rosegrant and Binswanger 1994; Neuman 2004; Libecap 2009;
Cook and Rabotyagov 2014). In short, based on differing local contextual variables, water transactions could threaten local CPRM design principles (Baggio
et al. 2016).
Alternatively, some districts facilitate water transactions by creating formal
rules that minimize risks and reduce costs if some of the benefits of leasing can
be captured by the district or the group as a whole. While some districts create friction surrounding water transactions, others are providing conditions that
provide opportunities to participate in transactions (Saleth and Dinar 2004).
CPRM research often recognizes that local institutions capable of protecting
group interests over individual gains are more resilient institutions (Ostrom 1990;
Heinmiller 2009). In either case, districts are attempting to maximize benefits at
the group level as CPRM institutions while minimizing their costs and exposure
to risk. Leasing water can present risks to some districts; in others, those risks are
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lower and leasing represents a new opportunity for members to realize private
benefits. When water transactions reduce the amount of water managed in the
system, it represents an existential threat to the main objective of the irrigation
district. Thus, this study suggests that low levels of participation by sellers in PES
schemes may be the outcome of a social dilemma resulting in a market failure.
That is, incomplete or inaccurate information provided to potential sellers by their
irrigation districts and/or other entities could be distorting the ‘market’ for water
leases. Research aimed at understanding the knowledge of these sellers is needed
to explore this possibility.
Districts that had performed physical infrastructure upgrades were less
affected by the physical constraints. Our results suggest that investments in technology (hard, human-made infrastructure, e.g. water piping systems) and institutional capacity (soft, human-made infrastructure, e.g. rules for transactions) are
necessary steps for enabling other institutional changes (Baggio et al. 2016). For
example, helping districts invest in piped systems is an initial step toward building a leasing program that could reduce risks and build trust between buyers and
sellers. Designing transaction programs that provide complementary services
such as adjudicating water rights in exchange for development of local water
leasing rules may help reduce perceived risks. These kinds of integrative strategies help build upon existing institutions rather than replacing them (MeinzenDick 2007).

6. Conclusion
The objective of this study was to increase our understanding of PES-type program integration across different CPRM institutions in a developed country.
Specifically, we wanted to better understand the diversity and potential influence
of irrigation districts on water transactions for instream flows in Oregon. Our
finding that districts have different responses to external institutional changes,
and that those differentiated responses have (re)shaped the intended outcomes of
water transactions, aligns with both theory and empirical findings on institutional
change (North 1990; Ostrom 2008). Differential responses to transactions across
districts in this study represent a range of different priorities, existing resource
and user conditions, and perspectives on the future. As such, there may often be
a need to better adapt incentive-based PES programs in ways that match local
institutions and conditions.
Understanding districts as CPRM institutions is operationally important to
PES program designs because it demonstrates that intermediary institutions shape
incentives and add to the rules framing participation in PES programs (Heinmiller
2009; German and Keeler 2010; Hayes et al. 2015). This raises questions about
how much influence local institutions have on individuals’ resource management
decisions, a topic on which more research would be welcome. We would expect to
find variation in the amount, type, effectiveness and direction of influence exerted
by districts on water users.
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Appendix A: Interview Guide
•

Can you please describe your role in the irrigation district (ID)?
◦◦ How long you have been working in this position?
◦◦ Tell me how you initially got involved with the ID.

•

Can you give me a physical description of the district?
◦◦ What type of irrigation infrastructure is present in your district?
◦◦ What are the primary sources of water for the district?

•

In your time here, have there been any major changes in infrastructure?
◦◦ What were the reasons for those upgrades?
◦◦ How was the project developed?
◦◦ What other entities were involved?

•

Can you tell me about the community that this water district serves?
◦◦ What are the range of water uses?
◦◦ How important is agriculture to the community?
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•

During your time with the district how have ecological or biophysical
conditions influenced district operations?
◦◦ For example, how are floods or droughts managed by the district?
◦◦ What other external events have impacted the management of the irrigation district?

•

In your time here have there been any major changes to the rules or bylaws
of the district?
◦◦ Can you describe that process of how rules are changed?
◦◦ How are water rights held in the district?

•

How does the district maintain contact with its water rights holders?
◦◦ In your time here, has the district been involved in water transactions?
◦◦ If yes, what kinds of transaction?

•

Are individual members of this district involved in water transactions?
◦◦ What kinds of transactions are common?
◦◦ What role does the district play in those transactions?
◦◦ What role has the state of Oregon or the Federal government played
in transactions?

•

When did the first transactions start happening?
◦◦ What is the general opinion about water transactions?
◦◦ Have water transactions been discussed during district meetings or in
district mailings?
◦◦ Has your district changed any rules or management practices due to
water transactions?
◦◦ What other organizations does the district work directly with?
◦◦ What kinds of projects do you collaborate on?

